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Abstract. At EUROCRYPT 2013, Garg, Gentry and Halevi proposed a
candidate construction (later referred as GGH13) of cryptographic multi-
linearmap (MMap). Despite weaknesses uncovered byHu and Jia (EURO-
CRYPT 2016), this candidate is still used for designing obfuscators.
The naive version of the GGH13 scheme was deemed susceptible to
averaging attacks, i.e., it could suffer from a statistical leak (yet no
precise attack was described). A variant was therefore devised, but it
remains heuristic. Recently, to obtain MMaps with low noise and mod-
ulus, two variants of this countermeasure were developed by Do¨ttling et
al. (EPRINT:2016/599).
In this work, we propose a systematic study of this statistical leakage
for all these GGH13 variants. In particular, we confirm the weakness of
the naive version of GGH13. We also show that, among the two variants
proposed by Do¨ttling et al., the so-called conservative method is not so
effective: it leaks the same value as the unprotected method. Luckily,
the leakage is more noisy than in the unprotected method, making the
straightforward attack unsuccessful. Additionally, we note that all the
other methods also leak values correlated with secrets.
As a conclusion, we propose yet another countermeasure, for which
this leakage is made unrelated to all secrets. On our way, we also make
explicit and tighten the hidden exponents in the size of the parameters,
as an effort to assess and improve the efficiency of MMaps.
Keywords: Cryptanalysis · Multilinear maps · Statistical leakages
Ideal lattices
1 Introduction
Since their introduction in cryptographic constructions by Joux in 2000 [25],
cryptographic bilinear maps, as provided by pairings on elliptic curves, have
enabled the construction of more and more advanced cryptographic protocols,
starting with the Identity-Based Encryption scheme of Boneh and Franklin [8].
More abstractly, a group equipped with an efficient bilinear map, and on which
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some discrete-logarithm like problems are hard (such as the bilinear Diffie-
Hellmann problem), provides foundation for a whole branch of cryptography. A
natural open question is whether it can be generalized to degrees higher than 2
while ensuring hardness of generalizations of the Diffie-Hellmann problem. Such
hypothetical objects are referred to as Cryptographic Multilinear Maps (or, for
short, MMaps).
In 2013, Garg, Gentry and Halevi [17] proposed a candidate construction for
MMaps related to ideal-lattices, yet without a clearly identified underlying hard
lattice problem. It differs from the pairing case in the sense that elements in the
low-level groups have no canonical representation, and that the representation is
noisy. Yet, these differences are not too problematic on the functionality front.
On the security front, it rapidly turned out that this construction was inse-
cure, at least in its original set-up. In particular, the natural one-round k-partite
protocol based on this MMap was broken by the zeroizing attack of Hu and
Jia [24]: this construction fails to securely mimic the tripartite protocol of [25].
More generally, the mere knowledge of a non-trivial representative of 0 tends
to make constructions based on this MMap insecure. Orthogonally, it has been
discovered that solving over-stretched versions of the NTRU problem (whose
intractability is necessary for the security of the GGH MMap) was significantly
easier than previously thought, due to the presence of an unusually dense sub-
lattice [1,12,26], yet this can be compensated at the cost of increasing param-
eters. Also, due to recent algorithms for the Principal Ideal Problem [6,7] and
Short generator recovery [10,14], the GGH MMap can be broken1 in quantum
polynomial time, and classical subexponential time exp(O˜(
√
n)), where n is the
dimension of the used ring.
Nevertheless, this candidate MMap was still considered in a weaker form,2 to
attempt realizing indistinguishability obfuscation (or, for short, iO). Several iO
candidates were broken by attacks that managed to build low-level encodings of
zero even if no such encodings were directly given (this is referred to as zeroizing
attacks, see e.g. [11,13]). To try to capture and prevent such attacks, a Weak
MMap model was devised in [18,34].
Some iO constructions come with a security proof based on assumptions
in the standard model [2,29,30], but cannot be securely instantiated with the
GGH13 MMap as they require low-level encodings of 0. Others are proved
secure in a non-standard model (the Generic MMap model [4,9] or the Weak
MMap Model [15,18]). These models remain not fully satisfactory, as they imply
Virtual-Black-Box Obfuscation [9,18], a provably impossible primitive [5]. The
latest candidate of Lin and Tessaro [31] did escape these pitfalls by relying on
pairings, but it required special Pseudo-Random Generators that were rapidly
proved not to exist [3,32].
1 The secret value h can be recovered exactly, allowing in particular to construct
zero-tester at larger levels.
2 Without providing any low-level encoding of 0, and keeping the order of the multi-
linear group secret.
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Statistical leaks in lattice-based cryptography. Early signature schemes based
on lattices [21–23] suffered from statistical leaks, which led to devastating
attacks [20,35]. Those leaks can be fixed in a provably secure way using a Gaus-
sian Sampling algorithm from Klein [27], as proven in [19]: the samples available
to the adversary are made statistically independent from the secret key.
Similar leaks are a worry in the original construction of [17], and therefore, a
candidate countermeasure was developed, making use of Klein’s sampling proce-
dure. Nevertheless, no formal statement was made on what this countermeasure
prevents: the countermeasure is heuristic. This particular countermeasure turned
out to be a difficulty when considering variants of the original scheme, as done
in [15]. This candidate obfuscator aims at reaching polynomially small errors
and modulus (in order to improve both efficiency and security of the GGH map,
especially in the light of the dense sublattice attacks [1,12,26]) and hence can-
not use the original sampling methods from [17]. Two modified versions of [17]
are then proposed in [15], a so-called conservative one, leading to quite efficient
parameters, and a so-called aggressive one.
Ideally, one wishes to make provable statements about those four variants,
as done in other contexts [19]. Unfortunately, in the context of MMaps, it is not
even clear what the statement should exactly be. The next best guarantee is a
precise understanding of what can be done from a cryptanalytic point of view,
as initiated in [17].
The analysis of the leak of [17] focuses on the covariance of products of
encodings of zero. One can (informally) argue that this analysis captures all
the information of the leakage. Indeed, up to discretization, such a product is
the product of several centered Gaussian distributions (non necessary spherical),
and such a distribution is fully identified by its covariance. The countermeasure
proposed in Sect. 6.4 of [17] attempts to make this covariance proportional to
the identity matrix (and therefore unrelated to all secrets) by sampling each
element of the product according to a spherical distribution, that is a distribution
whose covariance is proportional to the identity matrix. As we shall see, this
attempt is unsuccessful, as one of the factors of the product (namely, the one
related to the zero-testing parameter) is fixed. Obtaining several independent
multiples of it, with covariance proportional to the identity matrix, then reveals
an approximation of this factor.
Contributions. Our main contribution is to give a systematic study of the sta-
tistical leakage in the GGH13 scheme and its variants, in a simple framework we
define. We first suggest a common formalism that encompasses all the variants
at hand, by parametrising the sampling procedure for encodings by an arbitrary
covariance matrix. Following the nomenclature of [15,17], except for the second
one that had no clear name, we consider:
1. The simplistic method: the GGH MMap without countermeasure [17,
Sect. 4.1]. This method was only given for simplicity of exposition and was
already highly suspected to be insecure;
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2. The exponential method:3 the GGH MMap with countermeasure [17,
Sect. 6.4];
3. The conservative method, proposed in [15]—which we partly revisit to tackle
some of its limitations;
4. The aggressive method, proposed in [15]—we note that this method is specific
to the iO construction of [15], and is not applicable to all constructions over
the GGH MMap.
In order to formalize our study of the leakage, we propose a simple setting of
the GGH multilinear map. Indeed, due to the attacks in presence of encodings
of zero, the exact set-up for the analysis of the leakage in [17] is not relevant
anymore. We adjust their setting to not provide low-level encodings of zero
directly. Still, some relations between encodings are needed for the MMaps to
be non-trivial; to ensure that those relations do not allow zeroizing attacks, we
provide a security proof in the weak multilinear map model of [15,18,34]. For
ease of exposure, we restrict ourselves to degree κ = 2, yet our analysis easily
extends to higher degrees.
Using this framework, we are able to analyse a particular averaging attack
against the GGH multilinear map. On the one hand, our analysis shows that
Method 3 leads to the same leakage as Method 1. We also prove that with
Method 1, a polynomial-time attack can be mounted using the leakage. Interest-
ingly, it does not require the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm [20], unlike the approach
discussed in [17, Sects. 6.3.2 and 7.6]. Nevertheless, we did not manage to extend
the attack to Method 3: while the same quantity is statistically leaked, the num-
ber of samples remains too low for the attack to go through completely. On the
other hand, we show that the statistical leakage of Method 4 is similar to the
one of Method 2: perhaps surprisingly the aggressive method seems more secure
than the conservative one.
Finally, having built a better understanding of which information is leaked,
we devise a countermeasure that we deem more adequate than all the above:
5. The compensation method.
This method is arguably simpler, and provides better parameters. More impor-
tantly, applying the same leakage attack than above, one only obtains a distri-
bution whose covariance is independent of all secrets. We wish to clarify that
this is in no way a formal statement of security. The statistical attacks con-
sidered in this work are set up in a minimalistic setting, and extensions could
exist beyond this minimalistic setting. For example, one could explore what can
be done by varying the zero-tested polynomial, or by keeping certain encodings
fixed between several successful zero-tests.
As a secondary contribution, we also make explicit and tighten many hidden
constants present in the previous constructions, in an effort to evaluate and
improve the efficiency of GGH13-like MMaps.
3 The naming reflects the fact that this method leads to a modulus q which is expo-
nential in the number  of so-called atoms.
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Impact. This result may be useful in pursuit of an underlying hard problem on
which one could based the GGH multilinear map. Indeed, we show here that it is
possible to recover some information about secret elements, for all the previously
proposed sampling methods. Hence, an underlying hard problem (or the security
reduction) should capture this leak. This enables us to get a bit more insight
into what could be (or could not be) an underlying hard problem for the GGH
map. In that regard, finding such a hard underlying problem could be easier
with our new method, since one specific leak has been sealed. Again, we do not
claim that no other leaks exist.
Further, our analysis shows that the weak multilinear map model does not
capture averaging attacks. This is not surprising, as the weak multilinear map
model only allows to evaluate polynomials in the post-zero-test values, while
we need to average on them for this attack. But proving that averaging cannot
be achieved by evaluating polynomials is not so immediate. Interestingly, our
results prove it. Indeed, using averaging techniques, we were able to mount a
polynomial time attack against our setting when using the simplistic sampling
method (Method 1), but we also proved that in the weak multilinear map model,
no polynomial time attacks could be mounted. This proves that the weak mul-
tilinear map model does not capture averaging attacks.4
Finally, our new method severely decreases the length of encodings in the
GGH13 multilinear map, which substentially contribute to their practical feasi-
bility.
Outline of the article. In Sect. 2, we recall some mathematical background about
cyclotomic number fields and statistics. We also describe the GGH multilinear
map and detail the size of its parameters. In Sect. 3, we describe different sam-
pling methods for the GGH multilinear map, which come from [15,17], using
a common formalism so as to factor the later analysis. We describe our simple
setting and analyse the leakage in Sect. 4. The security proof of this simple set-
ting in the weak multilinear map model can be found in the full version of this
article [16]. Finally, we discuss the design of sampling methods in Sect. 5, and
propose a design we deem more rational.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Mathematical Background
Rings. We denote by R the ring of integers Z[X]/(Xn + 1) for some n which
is a power of 2 and K = Q[X]/(Xn + 1) its fraction field. We denote by σj :
K → C, with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the complex embeddings of K in C. We also denote
KR = R[X]/(Xn+1) the topological closure of K. For x ∈ KR, we denote xi ∈ R
its i-th coefficient, so that x =
∑n−1
i=0 xiX
i. For g ∈ K (or even KR) we denote
gR the ideal generated by g: gR = {gx|x ∈ R}. The complex conjugation over R
4 The precise component of the attack which is not captured by the weak multilinear
map model is the rounding operation performed at the end.
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and K is denoted ·¯. It is the automorphism of R sending X to X−1. We denote S
the subring of KR of symmetric elements, that is S = {x ∈ KR|x = x¯}. We set S+
the subset of symmetric positive elements of S, defined by S+ = {xx¯|x ∈ KR}.
Alternatively, S is the completion of the real subfield of K, and S+ is (the
completion of) the set of elements of K whose embeddings are all non-negative
real numbers. Note that S+ is closed under addition, multiplication, division,
but not under subtraction. The elements of S+ also admit one and exactly one
square root (resp. k-th root) in S+, which we denote
√· (resp. k√·) . Finally, we
call xx¯ ∈ S+ the autocorrelation5 of x ∈ KR, and denote it A(x). For Σ ∈ S+
it holds that A(
√
Σ) = Σ. We also define equivalence over S+ up to scaling
by reals, and write x ∼ y for invertible elements x, y ∈ S+ if x = αy for some
positive real α > 0. Let q be a prime congruent to 1 modulo 2n. We denote
by Rq the quotient ring R/(qR). For x ∈ R, we denote by [x]q (or [x] when
there is no ambiguity) the coset of the element x in Rq. We will often lift back
elements from Rq to R, in which case we may implicitly mean that we choose
the representative with coefficients in the range [−q/2, q/2]. To avoid confusion,
we will always write x−1 for the inversion in Rq, and keep the fraction symbols
1/x and 1x for inversion in K and KR.
Geometry. Because we work in the ring Z[X]/(Xn +1), the canonical geometry
of the coefficients embeddings is equivalent, up to scaling, to the geometry of
the Minkowski embeddings. We stick with the former, following the literature
on multilinear maps. More precisely, the inner product of two elements x, y ∈ K
is defined by 〈x, y〉 = ∑xiyi. The Euclidean norm (or 2-norm) is defined by
‖x‖ = √〈x, x〉. The ∞-norm is noted ‖x‖∞ = max |xi|.
We recall the following inequalities:
‖xy‖ ≤ √n · ‖x‖ · ‖y‖ (1)
‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖ ≤
√
n · ‖x‖∞ (2)
‖x‖2 ≤ ‖xx¯‖∞ (3)
‖x¯‖ = ‖x‖ and ‖x¯‖∞ = ‖x‖∞. (4)
Statistics. We denote by Pr[E] the probability of an event E. For a random
variable x over KR, we denote by E[x] the expectation of x, and by V[x] =
E[xx¯]−E[x]E[x¯] its variance. It should be noted that V[x] ∈ S+ for any random
variable x over KR. A random variable x is said centered if E[x] = 0, and isotropic
if V[x] ∼ 1. We recall Hoeffding’s inequality.
Theorem 1 (Hoeffding’s inequality). Let Y1, · · · , Ym be independent ran-
dom variables in R with the same mean μ ∈ R and such that |Yi| ≤ B for all i’s.
5 In an algebraic context, this would be more naturally described as the norm of x
relative to the maximal real subfield of K, yet for our purposes it is more adequate
to use the vocabulary of statistics.
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Then for all t > 0,
Pr
[∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
m
m∑
i=1
Yi − μ
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
≥ t
]
< 2e−
mt2
2B2 .
Hoeffding’s inequality, as given above, applies to random variables in R. In this
article, we will be interested in random variables in R. We will then see our
elements in R as vectors in Rn and apply Hoeffding’s inequality coefficient-wise.
Corollary 1 (Hoeffding’s inequality in R). Let Y1, · · · , Ym be independent
random variables in R with the same mean μ ∈ KR and such that ‖Yi‖∞ ≤ B
for all i’s. Let ε > 0, then
Pr
[∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
1
m
m∑
i=1
Yi − μ
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
∞
≥ B
√
2(lnn − ln ε)
m
]
< 2ε.
Proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, define Yi,j to be the j-th coefficient
of the variable Yi ∈ R and μj to be the j-th coefficient of μ. For a fixed j,
the variables Yi,j (where only i varies) are independent random variables in R
of mean μj . Moreover, as ‖Yi‖∞ ≤ B for all i’s, the coefficients Yi,j are also
bounded by B. We can then apply Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem 1) to them.
We obtain
Pr
[∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
1
m
m∑
i=1
Yi − μ
∥
∥
∥
∥
∥
∞
≥ B
√
2(lnn − ln ε)
m
]
= Pr
[
∃j :
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
m
m∑
i=1
Yi,j − μj
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
≥ B
√
2(lnn − ln ε)
m
]
≤
n−1∑
j=0
Pr
[∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
m
m∑
i=1
Yi,j − μj
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
≥ B
√
2(lnn − ln ε)
m
]
<
n−1∑
j=0
2e−
2mB2(ln n−ln ε)
2B2m =
n−1∑
j=0
2
ε
n
= 2ε.
We used the union bound and Hoeffding’s inequality with t = B
√
2(lnn−ln ε)
m . unionsq
Discrete Gaussians. For Σ ∈ S+ and x0 ∈ KR, we define the Gaussian weight
function on KR as
ρ√Σ,x0 : x → exp
(
−1
2
∥
∥
∥
∥
x − x0√
Σ
∥
∥
∥
∥
2
)
.
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For any shifted ideal I + c, I ⊂ K, c ∈ KR, we define the discrete Gaussian
distribution over I + c of parameter
√
Σ, centered in x0 by:
∀x ∈ I + c, DI+c,√Σ,x0(x) =
ρ√Σ,x0(x)
ρ√Σ,x0(I + c)
.
For concision, we write DI+c,√Σ instead of DI+c,√Σ,0 and ρ√Σ instead of ρ√Σ,0.
Theorem 2 (Reformulation of [19, Theorem 4.1.]). There exists a PPT
algorithm that given g ∈ R, c ∈ KR and a parameter Σ such that ‖g/
√
Σ‖ ≤
o(1/
√
log n), outputs x from a distribution negligibly close to DgR+c,√Σ.
This reformulation simply relies on the identity DgR+c,√Σ =
√
Σ
σ ·D(gR+c)/√Σ,σ.
We also recall that, above the smoothing parameter [33], a discrete Gaussian
resembles the continuous Gaussian, in particular it is almost centered at 0, and
of variance almost Σ.
Lemma 1. For any g ∈ K, Σ ∈ S+, c ∈ KR such that ‖g/
√
Σ‖ ≤ o(1/√log n),
if x ← DgR+c,√Σ, then ‖E[x]‖ ≤ ε · ‖
√
Σ‖ and ‖V[x] − Σ‖ ≤ ε · ‖Σ‖ for some
negligible function ε(n).
The proof of this result, using [33, Lemma 4.2], can be found in the full
version [16].
2.2 The GGH13 Multilinear Map
We describe in this section the GGH13 multilinear map [17], in its asymmetric
setting. The GGH13 multilinear map encodes elements of a ring of integers R,
modulo a secret small element g ∈ R. More concretely, an authority generates
the following parameters:
• an integer n which is a power of 2 (serving as the security parameter).
• a (small) element g in R. We denote by I = gR the ideal generated by g in R.
• a (large) positive integer q such that q ≡ 1 mod 2n. Originally, q was chosen
exponentially large in n [17], but variants were proposed for polynomially
sized q [15,28].
•  invertible elements [zi] ∈ R×q , for 1 ≤ i ≤ , chosen uniformly at random in
R×q .
• a zero-testing parameter [pzt] = [hz∗g−1] where [z∗] = [
∏
1≤i≤ zi] and h is
a random element in R, generated according to a Gaussian distribution of
standard deviation approximately
√
q.
We detail in Sect. 2.2 the size of the parameters described above (we will
choose them to ensure the correctness of the scheme). The elements n, q and pzt
are public while the parameters h, g and the zi’s are kept secret.
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Encoding of an element. The GGH13 multilinear map allows to encode cosets
of the form a + I for some element a in R. Let v ∈ {0, 1} be a vector of size .
An encoding of the coset a + I at level v is an element of Rq of the form
u =
[
(a + rg) · z−1v
]
where [zv ] = [
∏
i,v [i]=1 zi] and a + rg is a small element in the coset a + I.
We call v the level of the encoding.6 We abuse notation by saying that u is an
encoding of a (instead of an encoding of the coset a + I).
An encoding generated by the authority is called a fresh encoding, by oppo-
sition to encodings that are obtained by adding or multiplying other encod-
ings. The precise distribution of a + rg for a fresh encoding will be a discrete
Gaussian distribution over the coset a + I, but not necessarily a spherical one:
a + rg ← Da+I,√Σv . The shape Σv of this Gaussian is essentially what distin-
guishes the variants that we will discuss in Sect. 3.
Adding and multiplying encodings. If u1 and u2 are two encodings of ele-
ments a1 and a2 at the same level v then u1 + u2 is an encoding of a1 + a2 at
level v.
If u1 and u2 are two encodings of elements a1 and a2 at levels v and w with
v[i] ·w[i] = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ , then u1 ·u2 is an encoding of a1 ·a2 at level v+w
(where the addition is the usual addition on vectors of size ).
Zero-testing. We denote by v∗ = (1, . . . , 1) the maximum level of an encoding.
The zero testing parameter allows us to test if an encoding u at level v∗ is an
encoding of zero, by computing
[w] = [u · pzt].
If w is small compared to q (the literature usually requires its coefficients to be
less than q3/4), then u is an encoding of zero. Otherwise, it is not.
Size of the parameters and correctness. We define Q such that q = nQ and
L such that  = nL (the elements Q and L are not necessarily integers). The
bounds below on the size of g and h come from [17]. The secret generator g is
sampled so that:
‖g‖ = O(n), ‖1/g‖ = O(n2). (5)
Remark. There seems to be some inconsistencies in [17] about the size of g,
which is on page 10 sampled with width σ = O˜(
√
n), while on page 13 the
width σ is set to
√
nλ to ensure the smoothing condition σ ≥ η2−λ(Zn) (where
λ = O(n) denote the security parameter). Yet, according to [33, Lemma 3.3], it
holds that η2−λ(Zn) ≤ O(
√
λ + log n), so σ = O(
√
n) is sufficient, and we do
have ‖g‖ ≤ O(n) with overwhelming probability by [33, Lemma 4.4].
6 Remark that we could define encodings of level v even if v is not binary (but still
has non negative integer coefficients). This is not necessary for a honest use of the
GGH13 map, but we will use it in Sect. 4 for our attack.
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The numerator c = a + rg of a fresh encoding of a + I at level v is sampled
such that
‖c‖ = Θ(nγ+η·‖v‖1+νL), (6)
where γ, η and ν are positive reals, and depend on the sampling method, such
as the ones proposed in [15] (depending on the method, η and ν may be zero).
We describe later the different sampling methods and the values of γ, η and ν
associated to each method. When we do not need to focus on the dependence on
‖v‖1 and L, we just call E := Θ(nγ+η·‖v‖1+νL) the bound above. For each sam-
pling method described below, we choose this bound to be as small as possible
under the specific constraints that will arise with the sampling method.
The mildly large element h is sampled so that
‖h‖ = Θ(√nq). (7)
Remark. In the second variant proposed in [17, Sect. 6.4] to try to prevent aver-
aging attacks, the authors generate h according to a non spherical Gaussian
distribution. However, as h is sampled only once, its distribution does not mat-
ter for the attack we analyze in this article. This is why we only specify here the
size of h, and not its distribution.
We now give a condition on the modulus q to ensure correctness of the GGH13
multilinear map. This condition will depend on the number κ of fresh encodings
that we have to multiply in order to obtain a top level encoding. A natural
upper bound for κ is , the number of levels of the multilinear map. However,
in the following, we will be interested in cases where we are provided with fresh
encodings at a somewhat high level and we only need to multiply a small number
of them (much smaller than ) to obtain a top level encoding. Choosing a small
degree κ is motivated by the fact that we want to obtain a small modulus q.
We will see below that q should be at least exponential in κ. Hence, in order to
achieve a polynomial modulus q, it should be that κ is at most logarithmic in
the security parameter (while  can be much larger). In the simple setting we
describe in Sect. 4.1, we choose κ = 2, which enables q to be polynomial (if we
use the good sampling methods).
Correctness of zero-testing a homogeneous polynomial of degree κ, whose
absolute sum of the coefficients is bounded by nB and evaluated in fresh encod-
ings, is guaranteed if nB · ‖hg
∏κ
i=1 ci‖ ≤ q3/4. It is then sufficient to have
B +
κ + 1
2
+
Q + 1
2
+ 2 + κ(γ + νL) + η ≤ 3
4
Q. (8)
The term κ+12 appears from applying inequality (1) κ+1 times. One should also
note that
∑κ
i=1 ‖vi‖1 = ‖v∗‖1 = , because we can only zero test at level v∗
(where vi is the level of encoding ci). More compactly, correctness holds if:
B + 3 + κ(1/2 + γ + νL) + η ≤ Q/4. (9)
In our simple setting of the GGH multilinear map defined in Sect. 4.1, we
will only query the zero-testing procedure on encodings of this form, with κ = 2
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and B = log(m)/ log(n), for some constant m we will define later. Hence, taking
4 + 2γ + 2νL + η + log(m)/ log(n) ≤ Q/4 will be sufficient in our setting to
ensure correctness of the zero-testing procedure.
Remark. We note that the bound q3/4 for positive zero-tests is somewhat arbi-
trary and could very well be replaced by q/4, allowing to square-root the parame-
ter q. Indeed, the probability of a false positive during zero-testing would remain
as small as 2−n. This would have a serious impact on concrete efficiency and
security.
3 Sampling Methods
We describe in this section different sampling methods that can be used to
generate the fresh encodings of the GGH multilinear map and we give the values
of γ, η and ν that correspond to these methods. As said above, we will be
interested in cases where (at least some of) the fresh encodings have a somewhat
high degree and we just have to multiply a constant number of them (say 2) to
obtain an encoding at maximal level v∗. We denote by A the set of “atoms”, that
is the set of levels v ∈ {0, 1} at which we want to encode fresh encodings. In our
simple setting of the GGH multilinear map (see Sect. 4.1 for a full description
of our setting), we will chose A to be the set of levels v ∈ {0, 1} that have
weight exactly 1 or  − 1, where the weight of v is the number of its non-zero
coefficients. For all v ∈ A, we denote by v˜ = v∗ − v the complement of v. We
note that A is closed by complement.
In all the following sampling methods except the first one, one chooses a
representative zv ∈ R of [zv ] ∈ Rq for all v ∈ A. This representative will not
necessarily be the canonical one, with coefficients in [−q/2, q/2]. Then, we will
take Σv = σ2vzv z¯v , with σv = Θ(n
2‖1/zv‖). Using Inequalities (3) and (4), we
can see that ‖1/√Σv‖ ≤ 1/σv · n1/4 · ‖1/zv‖. Hence, with our choice of σv and
the fact that ‖g‖ = O(n), we obtain
∥
∥
∥
∥
g√
Σv
∥
∥
∥
∥ ≤
√
n · ‖g‖ ·
∥
∥
∥
∥
1√
Σv
∥
∥
∥
∥ = O
(
1
n1/4
)
= o
(
1√
log n
)
.
We can therefore apply Theorem 2 to sample the numerators of fresh encod-
ings at level v, according to a Gaussian distribution of parameter Σv . Using
tail-cut of Gaussian distributions, we have that if c is the numerator of a fresh
encoding, then ‖c‖ ≤ n‖√Σv‖ ≤ n1.5σv‖zv‖ with overwhelming probability.
This means that we can take
E ≤ Θ(n3.5 · ‖1/zv‖ · ‖zv‖). (10)
Hence, in the following methods (except the simplistic one), we will focus on
the size of ‖1/zv‖ · ‖zv‖ to get a bound on the value of E.
Remark. Inequality (10) above is not tight. We could at least improve it to
E ≤ Θ(n3+ε · ‖1/zv‖ · ‖zv‖) for any ε > 0, by taking σv = Θ(n1.75+ε‖1/zv‖) (it
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still satisfies the condition of Theorem 2) and by noticing that ‖c‖ ≤ n‖√Σv‖ ≤
n1.25σv‖zv‖ for the numerator of a fresh encoding. This ensures statistical close-
ness to the desired distribution up to exp(−n2ε). Considering that there are
already classical attacks in time exp(O˜(
√
n)) (namely, using [6,14] to recover h
from the ideal hR), one may just choose ε = 1/4.
3.1 The Simplistic Method
The simplistic method consists in always choosing Σv ∼ 1, independently of v
and zv . This is done by applying Klein’s algorithm [27], and requires for cor-
rectness [19, Theorem 4.1] that Σv = σ2 for a positive scalar σ ∈ R, where
σ ≥ ‖g‖ · ω(√log n). So by taking σ = Θ(n1+ε) with ε > 0, one may have
E = Θ(
√
nσ) = Θ(n1.5+ε), that is γ = 1.5 + ε and η = ν = 0.
This method was deemed subject to averaging attacks and hence less secure
than the following one in [17], but the authors claim that their attack attempts
failed because all recovered elements were larger that
√
q, and that averaging
attacks would need super-polynomially many elements.7 We make explicit an
attack, and will show that this attack is possible even for exponential q, as
long as Eκ remains polynomial: in other words, the presence of the mildly large
factor h (of size
√
q) can be circumvented.
3.2 The Exponential Method
We present here the countermeasure of [17, Sect. 6.4], generalized to multi-
dimensional universe, as done in [15, Sect. 2.1]. For 1 ≤ i ≤ , set zi to be the
canonical representative of [zi] in R (with coefficients in the range [−q/2, q/2]).
Using rejection sampling when choosing zi, assume that ‖zi‖·‖1/zi‖ ≤ Z; this is
efficient for Z as small as n5/2 using [15], and can even be improved to Z = n3/2
using Lemma 3 below and its corollary.
For v in A, set zv =
∏
zvii over R. Recall that Inequality (10) gives us: E ≤
Θ(n3.5‖1/zv‖ · ‖zv‖). But we have ‖zv‖ ≤ n(‖v‖1−1)/2
∏
i∈v ‖zi‖ and ‖1/zv‖ ≤
n(‖v‖1−1)/2
∏
i∈v ‖1/zi‖. Hence we can take
E = Θ(n2.5+‖v‖1 · Z‖v‖1) = Θ(n2.5+2.5‖v‖1).
This means that we have γ = 2.5, η = 2.5 and ν = 0.
Correctness is guaranteed for q ≥ nΩ() (because η = 0), and because  is
much larger than the constant degree κ in [15], this is not a satisfying solution,
as we aim at decreasing q to polynomial. Two alternatives (conservative and
aggressive) are therefore developed in [15].
7 Recall that the original proposal was setting E and therefore q to be super-
polynomial even for bounded degree  because of the drowning technique for pub-
licly sampling encodings. Since then, attacks using encodings of zero [13,24,34] have
restricted encodings to be private, allowing polynomially large E.
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3.3 The Conservative Method [15]
The first alternative suggested is to do as above, but reducing the zv modulo q,
that is, set zv to be the representative of [
∏
zvii ] with coefficients in [−q/2, q/2].
One then ensures, by rejection of all the zi’s together, that ‖zv‖ · ‖1/zv‖ ≤ n2.5
for all v ∈ A. This leads to E = Θ(n3.5 · n2.5) = Θ(n6) (i.e., γ = 6, η = ν = 0)
and therefore allows correctness for q as small as nO(κ), which is polynomial for
constant degree κ.
Using [15, Lemma 8] restated below, the authors conclude that this method
is quite inefficient because for the above bound to hold simultaneously for all
v ∈ A with good probability, n must increase together with . Indeed, using
Lemma 2, we can bound the probability that one of the zv does not satisfy
‖zv‖·‖1/zv‖ ≤ n2.5 by 2|A|/n = 4/n. So if we want this probability to be small
(say less than 1/2) in order for the sampling procedure to be efficient, we should
increase n with .
Lemma 2 (Lemma 8 from [15]). Let [z] be chosen uniformly at random in Rq
and z be its canonical representative in R (i.e., with coefficients in [−q/2, q/2]).
Then it holds that
Pr
[‖1/z‖ ≥ n2/q] ≤ 2/n.
In the following section, we revisit the conservative method by generalizing
this lemma.
3.4 The Conservative Method Revisited
In the following lemma, we introduce an extra degree of freedom c compared to
the lemma of [15], but also improve the upper bound from O(n1−c) to O(n1−2c).
Lemma 3. Let [z] be chosen uniformly at random in Rq and z be its repre-
sentative with coefficients between −q/2 and q/2. Then, for any c ≥ 1, it holds
that
Pr [z = 0 ∨ ‖1/z‖ ≥ nc/q] ≤ 4/n2c−1.
Corollary 2. Let [z] be chosen uniformly at random in R×q and z be its repre-
sentative with coefficients between −q/2 and q/2. Then, for any c ≥ 1, it holds
that
Pr [‖1/z‖ ≥ nc/q] ≤ 8/n2c−1.
We can use this corollary to compute the probability that one of the zv does
not satisfy ‖1/zv‖ ≤ nc/q when the [zi]’s are independent and chosen uniformly
at random in R×q . Indeed, the [zv ]’s are uniform in R
×
q because they are a product
of uniform invertible elements, and, by union bound, we have
Pr [∃v ∈ A s.t. ‖1/zv‖ > nc/q] ≤
∑
v∈A
Pr [‖1/zv‖ > nc/q]
≤ 8|A|
n2c−1
.
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If we want this probability to be less than 1/2, in order to re-sample all the zi’s
only twice on average, we should take
|A| ≤ n
2c−1
16
. (11)
But we also have ‖zv‖ ≤
√
n‖zv‖∞ ≤
√
nq, hence ‖1/zv‖ · ‖zv‖ ≤ nc+0.5. In
order to minimize E, we wish to minimize c, under (11). By taking the minimal
value of c that satisfies this constraint, and recalling that |A| = 2, we obtain
E = Θ(n4.5+L/2).
This means that γ = 4.5, ν = 0.5 and η = 0. This conservative method
revisited is the same as the original one, except that we improve on the encodings
size bound E.8 In the following, we will then only focus on the conservative
method revisited and not on the original one.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3). The proof of this lemma uses the same ideas as the
one of [36, Lemma 4.1], but here, the element z is sampled uniformly modulo q
instead of according to a Gaussian distribution. Let [z] be chosen uniformly at
random in Rq and z be its representative with coefficients between −q/2 and q/2.
Recall that we denote σj : K → C the complex embeddings of K in C, with
1 ≤ j ≤ n. We know that the size of z is related to the size of its embeddings.
Hence, if we have an upper bound on the |σj(1/z)|, we also have an upper bound
on ‖1/z‖. Moreover, the σj ’s are morphisms, so σj(1/z) = 1/σj(z), and it suffices
to have a lower bound on |σj(z)|.
Let j ∈ {1, · · · , n}, there exists a primitive 2n-th root of unity ζ such that
σj(z) =
n−1∑
i=0
aiζ
i,
where the ai’s are the coefficients of z, and so are sampled uniformly and inde-
pendently between −q/2 and q/2. As ζ is a primitive 2k-th root of unity for some
k, there exists i0 such that ζi0 = I, where I is a complex square root of −1. So
we can write
σj(z) = a0 + Iai0 + z˜,
for some z˜ ∈ C that is independent of a0 and ai0 . Now, we have that
Pr
[
|σj(z)| < q
nc
]
= Pr
[
a0 + Iai0 ∈ B(−z˜,
q
nc
)
]
≤ Vol(B(−z˜,
q
nc ))
q2
≤ 4
n2c
,
8 We also change a bit the point of view by fixing n first and then obtaining an upper
bound on  (which will appear because ν = 0 in E), while the authors of [15] first
fix  and then increase n consequently.
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where B(−z˜, q/nc) is the ball centered in −z˜ of radius q/nc. A union bound
yields that
Pr
[
∃j, |σj(z)| < q
nc
]
≤ n · 4
n2c
=
4
n2c−1
.
Which in turns implies
Pr
[
∀j,
∣
∣
∣
∣σj
(
1
z
)∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤
nc
q
]
≥ 1 − 4
n2c−1
.
To complete the proof, we use the fact that for cyclotomic fields of power-
of-two order, we have ‖1/z‖ ≤ maxj(|σj(1/z)|). This gives the desired result.
unionsq
Proof (Proof of Corollary 2). First, note that sampling [z] uniformly in R×q is the
same as sampling [z] uniformly in Rq and re-sampling it until [z] is invertible.
We denote by U(Rq) (resp. U(R×q )) the uniform distribution in Rq (resp. R
×
q ).
We then have that
Pr
[z]←U(R×q )
[‖1/z‖ ≥ nc/q] = Pr
[z]←U(Rq)
[‖1/z‖ ≥ nc/q | [z] ∈ R×q ].
But using the definition of conditional probabilities, we can rewrite
Pr
[z]←U(Rq)
[‖1/z‖ ≥ nc/q | [z] ∈ R×q ] =
Pr[z]←U(Rq)[[z] ∈ R×q and ‖1/z‖ ≥ nc/q]
Pr[z]←U(Rq)[[z] ∈ R×q ]
.
The numerator of this fraction is less than Pr[z]←U(Rq)[‖1/z‖ ≥ nc/q], which
is less than 4n2c−1 using Lemma 3. And at least half of the elements of Rq are
invertible (if q is prime, we can even say that the proportion of non invertible
elements is at most n/q, because q ≡ 1 mod 2n). Hence, Pr[z]←U(Rq)[[z] ∈
R×q ] ≥ 1/2 and we obtain the desired result
Pr
[z]←U(R×q )
[‖1/z‖ ≥ nc/q] ≤ 8
n2c−1
.
unionsq
3.5 The Aggressive Method
This aggressive method was proposed by Do¨ttling et al. in [15] in order to instan-
tiate the GGH multilinear map for their obfuscator. This method cannot be used
for any set of atoms A, as it relies on the fact that the levels at which we encode
fresh encodings have a specific structure. Indeed, for each v ∈ A, we have either
[zv ] = [zi] for some i ∈ {1, · · · , } or [zv ] = [z∗ · z−1i ]. Using this remark, the
secret [zi]’s are generated in the following way.
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For i from 1 to  do:
– sample a uniformly random invertible element [zi] in Rq. Let zi be the rep-
resentative of [zi] in R with coefficients between −q/2 and q/2, and z˜i be the
representative of [z−1i ] in R with coefficients between −q/2 and q/2.
– until both following conditions are satisfied, re-sample [zi]:
‖1/zi‖ ≤ n3/q (12)
‖1/z˜i‖ ≤ n/q. (13)
– if i = , we also re-sample [zi] until this third condition is met
‖1/z∗‖ ≤ n/q, (14)
where z∗ is the representative of [
∏
1≤i≤ zi] with its coefficients between −q/2
and q/2.
Remark. As we sample the [zi]’s from i = 1 to , when we generate [z] all other
[zi]’s are already fixed, so we can define [z∗].
Note that with this method, we re-sample each zi an expected constant num-
ber of times, independently of . Indeed, all [zi]’s for i ≤  − 1 are sampled
independently. And the two conditions we want are satisfied except with prob-
ability at most 8n for each condition (using Corollary 2 with [zi] and [z
−1
i ] that
are uniform in R×q and with c = 3 or c = 1). So, applying a union bound, the
probability that we have to re-sample [zi] is at most 16n , which is less than 1/2
if n ≥ 32. The idea is the same for [z] except that we also want ‖1/z∗‖ to be
small. But all [zi] for i <  are already fixed, so [z∗] only depends on [z] and is
uniform in R×q . Hence this last condition is also satisfied except with probability
8
n from Corollary 2. And the probability that the three conditions are met for
[z] is at least 1/2 as long as n ≥ 48.
To conclude, if n ≥ 48, the procedure described above will sample each [zi]
at most twice in average, independently of the choice of . So we can choose 
arbitrarily large and the sampling procedure will take time O() · poly(n).
It remains to choose our representative zv ∈ R of [zv ] ∈ Rq and to get a
bound on ‖1/zv‖ · ‖zv‖ for all v ∈ A, in order to get the value of E. We will
show that ‖zv‖ · ‖1/zv‖ ≤ n4 for some choice of the representative zv we detail
below.
First case. If v has weight 1, that is [zv ] = [zi] for some i, then we take
zv = zi. With our choice of [zi], we have that ‖1/zv‖ ≤ n3/q. And as ‖zv‖
has its coefficients between −q/2 and q/2 we have that ‖zv‖ ≤
√
nq and hence
‖zv‖ · ‖1/zv‖ ≤ n3.5 ≤ n4.
Second case. If v has weight  − 1, then there exists i ∈ {1, · · · , } such that
[zv ] = [z∗ ·z−1i ]. We choose as a representative of [zv ] the element zv = z∗ ·z˜i ∈ R,
with z∗ and z˜i as above (with coefficients between −q/2 and q/2). We then have
‖1/zv‖ = ‖1/z∗ · 1/z˜i‖ ≤
√
n · ‖1/z∗‖ · ‖1/z˜i‖ ≤ n2.5/q2.
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Further, we have that ‖zv‖ = ‖z∗ · z˜i‖ ≤
√
n · √nq · √nq = n1.5q2. This finally
gives us
‖zv‖ · ‖1/zv‖ ≤ n4.
To conclude, this method gives us
E = Θ(n7.5).
This means that γ = 7.5 and both η and ν are zero.
Remark. For all methods with Σv ∼ zv z¯v (i.e., all methods except the simplistic
one), if c ← DI+a,√Σv is sampled using a Gaussian distribution of standard
deviation
√
Σv , we can rewrite c = c∗zv with c∗ ← D I+a
zv
,σv
for some σv ∈ R.
Note that c∗ is now a following a spherical Gaussian distribution but its support
depends on zv . In addition to this remark, one can observe that in all the methods
described above, there exists a real σ such that σvσv˜ = σ for all v ∈ A (in fact,
σv only depends on the weight of v in all the methods above). This means
that for every fresh encodings [cvz−1v ] and [cv˜z
−1
v˜ ] at level v and v˜ generated
independently, we have an element c∗ ∈ K, following an isotropic distribution9
of variance σ2 such that cv cv˜ = c∗zvzv˜ in R. Again, we note that the support
of c∗ depends on zv and zv˜ , but as σ is larger than the smoothing parameter,
this has no influence on the variance of c∗ (by Lemma 1).
A summary of the different values of γ, η and ν for the different sampling meth-
ods can be found in Table 1.
4 Averaging Attack
4.1 Our Simple Setting of the GGH Multilinear Map
To study the leakage of the GGH multilinear map, we need to make reasonable
assumptions on what is given to the adversary. It has been shown in [24] that
knowing low level encodings of zero for the GGH13 multilinear map leads to
zeroizing attacks that completely break the scheme. So our setting should not
provide any, yet we will provide enough information for some zero-tests to pass.
To this end, we will prove our setting to be secure in the weak multilinear map
model, which supposedly prevents zeroizing attacks.
This setting is inspired by the use of multilinear maps in current candidate
obfuscator constructions, and more precisely the low noise candidate obfuscator
of [15]. Yet, for easier analysis, we tailored this setting to the bare minimum.
We will assume the degree of the multilinear map to be exactly κ = 2, and will
provide the attacker with elements that pass zero-test under a known polynomial.
The restriction κ = 2 can easily be lifted but it would make the exposition of
the model and the analysis of the leakage less readable.
9 c∗ is isotropic as it is the product of two independent isotropic Gaussian variables.
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More precisely, we fix a number m > 1 of monomials, and consider the
homogeneous degree-2 polynomial:
H(x1, y1, . . . , xm, ym) =
∑
xiyi.
Recall that we chose the set of “atoms” A to be the set of levels v ∈ {0, 1}
that have weight exactly 1 or −1, where the weight of v is the number of its non-
zero coefficients. For all v ∈ A, we let v˜ = v∗−v (we say that v˜ is the complement
of v). We assume that for each v ∈ A of weight 1, the authority reveals encodings
uv ,1, . . . , uv ,m at level v of random values av ,1, . . . , av ,m modulo I, and encodings
uv˜ ,1, . . . , uv˜ ,m at level v˜ of random values av˜ ,1, . . . , av˜ ,m modulo I, under the only
constraint that
H(av ,1, av˜ ,1, . . . , av ,m, av˜ ,m) = 0 mod I.
We remark that generating almost uniform values a·,· under the constraint above
is easily done, by choosing all but one of them at random, and setting the last
one to
av˜ ,m = −a−1v ,m
m−1∑
i=1
av ,iav˜ ,i mod I.
In the weak multilinear map model [15,18,34], we can prove that an attacker
that has access to this simple setting of the GGH multilinear map cannot recover
a multiple of the secret element g, except with negligible probability. The def-
inition of the weak multilinear map model and the proof that an attacker can-
not recover a multiple of g can be found in the full version [16].10 This weak
multilinear-map model was used to prove security of candidate obfuscators in
[15,18], as it is supposed to capture zeroizing attacks, like the ones of [11,34]. In
the weak multilinear map model, recovering a multiple of g is considered to be
a successful attack. This is what motivates our proof that no polynomial time
adversary can recover a multiple of g in our simple setting, under this model.
4.2 Analysis of the Leaked Value
We describe in this section the information we can recover using averaging
attacks, depending on the sampling method. We will see that depending on the
sampling method, we can recover an approximation of A(z∗h/g), or an approxi-
mation of A(h/g) or even the exact value of A(h/g). In order to unify notation,
we introduce the leakage L, which will refer to A(z∗h/g) or A(h/g) depending the
method. We explain below what is the value of L for the different methods, and
how we can recover an approximation of it. In the case of the simplistic method,
we also explain how we can recover the exact value of L from its approximation
and how to use it to create a zero-testing parameter at level 2v∗.
10 The idea of the proof is the same as in [15,18], in a much simpler context (this is
based on a generalized version of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma from [34]).
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Statistical leakage. Let v ∈ A be of weight 1. We denote by [uv ] the encod-
ing [H(uv ,1, uv˜ ,1, . . . , uv ,m, uv˜ ,m)]. Recall that we have [ui,v ] = [ci,vz−1v ], where
ci,v = ai,v + ri,vg for some ri,v ∈ R. So using the definition of H and the fact
that [uv ] passes the zero test, we can rewrite
[uvpzt] = [H(cv ,1, cv˜ ,1, . . . , cv ,m, cv˜ ,m)(zvzv˜ )−1 · z∗hg−1]
= [H(cv ,1, cv˜ ,1, . . . , cv ,m, cv˜ ,m) · hg−1]
= H(cv ,1, cv˜ ,1, . . . , cv ,m, cv˜ ,m) · h/g.
Note that the product of the last line is in R, as it is a product of small
elements compared to q. Also, the first term is a small multiple of g so we can
divide by g. We denote by wv ∈ R the value above (i.e., the representative of
[uvpzt] with coefficients in [−q/2, q/2]). The term h/g of the product is fixed,
but the first factor H(cv ,1, cv˜ ,1, . . . , cv ,m, cv˜ ,m) depends on v: we can average
over it. We now analyze this first factor, depending on the method we choose
for generating the fresh encodings of the GGH map. We will denote by Yv the
random variable H(cv ,1, cv˜ ,1, . . . , cv ,m, cv˜ ,m).
By definition of the polynomial H, we know that Yv =
∑
ci,v ci,v˜ . Moreover,
all the ci,v are independent when i or v vary. So the ci,v ci,v˜ are centered random
variables of variance ΣvΣv˜ (observe that the variance of a product of indepen-
dent centered variables is the product of their variances) and Yv is a centered
random variable of variance mΣvΣv˜ (recall that H is a sum of m monomials).
We now consider several cases, depending on the choice of Σv .
Case 1 (the simplistic method). In this case, we have Σv = σ2 for all v ∈ A,
for some σ ∈ R. This means that the Yv are centered isotropic random variables
with the same variance. Let us call μ := E[A(Yv )] = mσ2 ∈ R+ this variance. If
we compute the empirical mean of the A(Yv ), this will converge to μ and we can
bound the speed of convergence using Hoeffding’s inequality. Going back to the
variables wv = Yv · h/g, we have that E [A(wv )] = μ · A(h/g) for some μ in R+.
Furthermore, all the A(wv ), with v of weight 1, are independent variables with
the same mean, so we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality.
Case 2 (the conservative method). In this case, we chose Σv ∼ zvzv˜ . We do not
know the variance of the Yv (because the zv are secret) but we will be able to
circumvent this difficulty, by averaging over the zv ’s.
First, using the remark we made at the end of Sect. 3, we have that
Yv =
∑
ci,v ci,v˜ =
∑
c∗i,vzvzv˜ , with the c
∗
i,v being independent centered isotropic
random variables with the same variance σ2 ∈ R+. Hence, we can rewrite
Yv = Xvzvzv˜ with Xv a centered isotropic variable of variance mσ2 (which
is independent of v). Unlike the previous case, we now have some zvzv˜ that
contribute in Yv. However, we will be able to remove them again by averaging.
Indeed, even if all the zv satisfy [zvzv˜ ] = [z∗] in Rq, this is not the case
in R, and that individually each zv is essentially11 uniform in the hypercube
11 Up to the invertibility condition in Rq.
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[−q/2, q/2]n, in particular it is isotropic. For our analysis, let us treat the zvzv˜
as random variables in R, that are isotropic and independent when v varies.
The isotropy follows from the fact that the two factors are isotropic. The inde-
pendence assumption is technically incorrect, yet as the only dependence are of
arithmetic nature over Rq and that the elements in question are large, one does
not expect the correlation to be geometrically visible.
We will call μz := E [A(zvzv˜ )] their variance. Recall that as the zvzv˜ are
isotropic, μz is in R+. While the independence assumption may be technically
incorrect, experiments confirm that the empirical mean E [A(zvzv˜ )] does indeed
converge to some μz ∈ R+ as the number of sample grows, and more precisely
it seems to converge as μz · (1 + ε) where ε ∈ KR satisfies ‖ε‖∞ = O˜(
√
1/|A|),
as predicted by the Hoeffding bound (results of the experiments are given in the
full version [16]).
Assuming that the Xv are independent of the zvzv˜ ,12 we finally obtain
E[A(Yv )] = E[A(Xv )]E[A(zvzv˜ )] = mσ2μz.
We denote by μ = mσ2μz this value. As in the previous case, the variables
A(wv ) are independent (when v has weight 1) and have the same mean
E [A(wv )] = μ · A(h/g),
with μ ∈ R+.
Case 3 (the exponential and aggressive methods). In these methods, we can again
write Yv = Xvzvzv˜ with Xv a centered isotropic variable of variance mσ2 for
some σ ∈ R+, independent of v. However, unlike the previous case, the zvzv˜ are
not isotropic variables anymore and therefore the z’s do not “average-out”.
In the exponential method, the identity zvzv˜ = z∗ holds over R (where
z∗ =
∏
i zi ∈ R is a representative of [z∗]), hence, zvzv˜ is constant when v
varies, and we have
E [A(wv )] = μ · A(hz∗/g),
for some scalar μ ∈ R+.
In the aggressive method, we have zvzv˜ = z∗ ·z˜i ·zi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ , with z∗
the representative of [z∗], zi the representative of [zi] and z˜i the representative
of [z−1i ] with coefficients in [−q/2, q/2]. The element z∗ is fixed, but, as in the
conservative case, we can see the z˜i · zi as isotropic variables. Assuming they are
independent, we then have E [A(zvzv˜ )] = μzA(z∗) for some scalar μz ∈ R+. And
we again have
E [A(wv )] = μ · A(hz∗/g),
for some scalar μ ∈ R+.
12 We can view the variables c∗i,v as being independent of the variables zv because
the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution is larger than the smoothing
parameter (see Lemma 1).
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Conclusion on the average. To conclude, we have argued that in all methods,
E [A(wv )] = μ · L
for some scalar μ ∈ R+, where the leaked variable L depends on the sampling
method in the following way:
• L = A(h/g) for the simplistic and the conservative methods.
• L = A(hz∗/g) for the exponential and the aggressive methods.
Now, using the fact that the random variables A(wv ) are independent for
different v ∈ A of weight 1, we can compute their empirical mean and Hoeffding’s
inequality will allow us to bound the distance to the theoretical mean. In the
following we assume that we know μ.13
Relative error of the leakage. Compute
W =
2
|A|
∑
v∈A
v of weight 1
A(wv )
the empirical mean of the random variables A(wv ). This is an approximation of
μ · L. We know that the coefficients of the random variable wv are less than q,
so the coefficients of A(wv ) are less that nq2. By applying Hoeffding’s inequality
in R (Corollary 1) with ε = 1/n, B = nq2 and m = |A|/2, we have that ‖W −
μ · L‖∞ < nq
2√8 lnn√
|A| (except with probability at most 2/n). As the coefficients
of μL are of the order of nq2, we have a relative error δ <
√
8 lnn/|A| for each
coefficient of μL. As μ is known, this means that we know L with a relative error
at most
√
8 lnn/|A|.14
Unfortunately, we cannot directly recover the exact value of L because its
coefficients are not integers. When L = A(hz∗/g), i.e., for the exponential and
aggressive methods, we do not know how to use this approximation of L to
recover the exact value of L.15 When L = A(h/g), i.e., for the simplistic and
conservatives methods, we can circumvent this difficulty. The idea is to trans-
form our approximation of L into an approximation of an element r ∈ R, with
coefficients that are integers of logarithmic bit-size. Indeed, if we have an approx-
imation of r with error less that 1/2 we can round its coefficients and recover
the exact value of r. And we can get such an approximation using a polynomial
13 The value of the scalar μ can be obtained from the parameters of the multilinear
maps. If we do not want to analyze the multilinear map, we can guess an approxi-
mation of μ with a sufficiently small relative error, by an exhaustive search.
14 Again, if we do not know μ, we can guess an approximation of μ with relative error
at most
√
8 lnn/|A| (so that it has no influence on our approximation of L), with
an exhaustive search.
15 Note that if we recover the exact value of A(hz∗/g), then its denominator is a multiple
of g and this is considered as a success of the attacker in the weak multilinear map
model.
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number of samples because the coefficients we want to recover have logarithmic
bit-size. This is what we explain in next subsection. Unfortunately, we will see
that for the conservative method, the number of samples we need to be able to
round r to its exact value is not compatible with the constraint we had on |A|
for being able to generate the zv .
From the leakage to a complete attack against the GGH map. In this
section, we explain how we can recover the exact value of A(h/g), when L =
A(h/g) and we have enough samples. We then show how we can use this exact
value to construct a zero-testing parameter at level 2v∗.
Recovering L exactly when L = A(h/g). In the following, we assume that
we have an approximation of A(h/g) with relative error δ <
√
8 lnn/|A|
and we want to recover the exact value of A(h/g). Let u be any encod-
ing at level v∗ that passes the zero test (we can take u to be one of the
[uv ] = [H(uv ,1, uv˜ ,1, . . . , uv ,m, uv˜ ,m)]). We have that [u · pzt] = c · h/g ∈ R
for some small multiple c of g. In particular, the coefficients of c are somehow
small16 and are integers. Using our approximation W of μ ·A(h/g) with relative
error δ plus the fact that we know μ and c ·h/g, we can recover an approximation
of A(c) with relative error at most δ · n2 by computing A(c · h/g) · μ · W−1.
The coefficients of A(c) are integers and are less than m2n2E4. Indeed, c =
H(cv ,1, cv˜ ,1, . . . , cv ,m, cv˜ ,m) for some v and we have ‖cv ,i‖ ≤ E for all v’s and i’s.
So we know that ‖c‖ ≤ mn1/2E2 and we get the desired bound on ‖A(c)‖∞.
Hence, if we have an approximation of the coefficients of A(c) with relative
error at most 12m2n2E4 , the absolute error is less that 1/2 and we can round
the coefficients to recover A(c) exactly. We can then recover A(h/g) exactly by
computing A(c · h/g)/A(c).
Putting together the conditions we got on the parameters, we have δ <√
8 lnn
|A| and we want δ ·n2 < 12m2n2E4 to be able to recover A(c). This is satisfied
if
√
8 lnn
|A| <
1
2m2n4E4 , i.e., |A| > 32E8m4n8 lnn.
To conclude, if |A| > 32E8m4n8 lnn, we can recover A(g/h) ∈ K exactly.17
In Sect. 4.3, we compare this constraint to the ones we had for the samplings
methods. We will see that for the simplistic method, our constraints are compat-
ible, so we can perform the attack. But this is not the case with the conservative
method.
Using A(h/g) to create a zero testing parameter at a forbidden level. We present
here a possible way of using the recovered value A(h/g). Note that in current
obfuscation model (for instance the weak multilinear map model of [18] or [15]),
recovering A(h/g) is already considered as a success for the attacker. Indeed,
its denominator is a multiple of A(g) = gg¯ so in particular we have recovered a
16 Recall that q may be exponentially large but we assumed that the numerator of a
top level encoding remains polynomial in n.
17 Note that this bound does not depends on q but only on E. This is why our attack
still works even if q is exponential in n, as long as E remains polynomial in n.
On the Statistical Leak of the GGH13 Multilinear Map and Some Variants 487
multiple of g, which is considered as a success of the attacker in these models.18
Moreover, even if we do not consider that recovering a multiple of g is bad news,
we present here a way of using A(h/g) to create a zero-testing parameter at a
higher level than v∗ (here we create a zero-testing parameter at level 2v∗).
First, note that the complex conjugation ·¯ in R is compatible with Rq. Indeed,
let c, r ∈ R, we have c + qr = c + qr = c + qr (because ·¯ is R-linear). So
c + qr ≡ c mod q and we can define the operation ·¯ in Rq by [r] = [r]. We will
use this to construct our zero-testing parameter. Let again [u] be an encoding
of zero at level v∗ and write [u] = [c · (z∗)−1] where c is a small multiple of g.
Compute
p′zt = [u · p2zt · pzt · A(h/g)−1]
=
[
c
z¯∗
· (z
∗)2h2
g2
· z¯
∗h
g
· gg
hh
]
=
[
(z∗)2 · (hc¯)
g
]
.
As hc¯ is small compared to q, this is likely to give us a zero-testing parameter at
level 2v∗. To be sure that we can indeed zero-test at level 2v∗, we should check
that the noise obtained at that level, when multiplied by hc¯, does not become
larger than q.
A sufficient condition for this attack to succeed is that
B + 3 + 3κ(1/2 + γ + νL) + η ≤ Q/4 (15)
which is a variation on Inequality (9) where κ has been replaced by 3κ.
Note that the typical choice of q in [15,17] includes quite some extra margin
compared to our condition (9). But even if q is chosen tightly following Inequal-
ity (9), it is not clear that the attack is prevented. Indeed, these conditions (9)
and (15) are derived from the worst case inequality (1) (‖xy‖ ≤ √n · ‖x‖ · ‖y‖),
and may therefore be far from tight in the average case. In fact, ‖xy‖/(‖x‖ ·‖y‖)
can be arbitrarily small for well chosen x and y.
Determining whether there exist parameters that guarantee that legitimate
zero-tests at level v∗ almost always succeed while fraudulent zero-tests at level
2v∗ almost always fail would require a quite refined analysis of the distributions
at hand, which is beyond the scope of this work. Indeed, we find it preferable to
block this type of attacks by more robust means.
4.3 Noise Analysis of the Leakage
We sum up in this section the leakage that we can obtain and with which pre-
cision, depending on the sampling methods presented in Sect. 3.
18 For this to be true, we need h and g to be co-prime. But as the ideal 〈g〉 is prime,
this will be true unless h is a multiple of g. And the case where h is a multiple of g
is not a problem, as we can easily recover multiples of h (and so multiples of g).
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The simplistic method. In this method, we have L = A(h/g). Recall that in
this case, we can recover the exact value of L if  > 16E8m4n8 lnn (using the
fact that |A| = 2). But in this method, we had E = O(n1.5+ε), for any ε > 0.
Hence, taking  = Θ(n20+8εm4 lnn) satisfies the conditions for generating the
parameters plus our condition  > 16E8m4n8 lnn. To conclude, when using
the simplistic method with some choice of the parameters, we can recover the
exact value A(h/g) and use it to construct a forbidden zero-testing parameter at
level 2v∗. Note that recovering A(h/g) also means that we recovered a multiple
of g. However, we proved that in the weak multilinear map model, no polynomial
time attacker could recover a multiple of g. This proves that the averaging attack
described above is not captured by the weak multilinear map model.
Remark. For this sampling method, as Σv ∼ 1, we do not need to average over
the v, so we could also have  = 2 as long as we have enough samples for each v.
The exponential method. In this method, we have L = A(z∗h/g). We can recover
an approximation of μL with relative error at most
√
8 lnn
|A| . We do not know if
it is possible to recover L exactly.
The conservative method revisited. In this method, we have L = A(h/g), we
can recover an approximation of μL with relative error at most
√
8 lnn
|A| accord-
ing to our heuristic analysis. While the independence condition between the
A(zvzv˜ ) for applying Hoeffding’s bound may not be satisfied, we show that this
rate of convergence seems correct in practice (see the experiments in the full
version [16]).
Recall that if  > 16E8m4n8 lnn, then we can recover A(h/g) exactly. But
for the sampling method to work, we need to take E = Θ(n4.5
√
). Hence, the
condition  > 16E8m4n8 lnn can be rewritten
 > Θ(n444m4 lnn).
This condition cannot be satisfied, so we cannot have enough samples for our
attack when using this sampling method. And all we get is an approximation of
μA(h/g). Nevertheless, the only thing that prevents the full attack is the size
of the parameters we have to choose in order to be able to generate the fresh
encodings.
The aggressive method. In this method, we have L = A(z∗h/g). We can recover
an approximation of μL with relative error at most
√
8 lnn
|A| . We do not know if
it is possible to recover L exactly.
4.4 Conclusion
We give in Table 1 a summary of the parameters used for the different sampling
methods, and of the resulting leakage. The column’constraints’ specifies possible
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constraints on the parameters or on the atoms set A, that arise when using this
sampling method. Recall that due to the correctness bound (9), there is always a
constraint on the modulus q, so we do not mention it in the column ‘constraints’.
This constraint on q can be obtained from the columns γ, η and ν, using the
formula log q ≥ 4 log(n)(3 + κ/2 + κγ + κνL + η) + 4 log(m).
Table 1. Summary of the leakage analysis, depending on the sampling method. This
includes our new method, sketched in Sect. 5. We recall that, according to correctness
bound (9), the modulus q must satisfy log q ≥ 4 log(n)(3+κ/2+κγ+κνL+η)+4 log(m).
Sampling method γ η ν leakage L full attack? constraints
Simplistic [17] 1.5 + ε 0 0 A(h/g) yes none
Exponential [17] 2.5 2.5 0 A(z∗h/g) no none
Conservative [15] 6 0 0 A(h/g) no n ≥ 4
Conservative (revisited) 4.5 0 0.5 A(h/g) no none
Aggressive [15] 7.5 0 0 A(z∗h/g) no structure of A
Compensation (Sec. 5) 1.5 + 1/κ + ε 0 0 1 no none
We have seen that the leakage obtained in the conservative method is the
same as the one of the unprotected scheme (the simplistic method). However,
in the case of the conservative method, the number of available samples is not
sufficient to complete the attack, as it is the case in the simplistic method.
This limitation on the number of samples comes from some constraints in the
sampling procedure and seems a bit accidental, we do not find this version of
the countermeasure fully satisfactory.
We can also question the security of the other methods (exponential and
aggressive), which leak an approximation of A(hz∗/g), related to secret values.
More precisely, one could wonder whether this noisy leakage could be combined
with the knowledge of pzt = [hz∗g−1] to mount an attack. As this problem does
not look like any traditional (ideal) lattice problem, we fail to conclude beyond
reasonable doubt that it should be intractable. We would find it more rational
to make the leakage unrelated to secret parameters. In the following section, we
propose such a design, which is simple, and leads to better parameters.
5 The Compensation Method
In this section, we propose a new sampling method which is designed so that the
leakage L that an attacker can recover by using the averaging attack described
above, reveals no information about secret parameters of the GGH map. Never-
theless, we note that even if the attack described above does not apply directly
to this method, other averaging attacks may be able to leak secret information.
An idea could be to fix some encodings and average over the others.
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Discussion on design. We have seen that choosing different covariance parame-
ters Σv at different levels v can in fact make the leak worse, as the attacker can
choose to average them out. We also remark that the parameters [zv ] can be pub-
licly re-randomized without affecting anything else, in particular without affect-
ing the covariance Σv of the numerator of the encodings. Indeed, we can choose
random invertible elements [zˆi] ∈ R×q , and apply the following transformation
to all encodings ev at level v, as well as to the zero-testing parameter [pzt]:
[ev ] →
[
∏
i∈v
zˆ−1i
]
· [ev ], [pzt] →
[
∏
i∈v
zˆi
]
[pzt].
This means that the relation between the covariance Σv and the denominators
zv can be publicly undone while maintaining functionality.
The compensation method. We therefore proceed to set Σv = Σ for all levels v,
and to choose Σ independently of the zv . Doing so, we observe that the leakage
L will generically be:
L ∼ Σκ · A(h/g). (16)
We then choose Σ ∼ A(g/h)1/κ, ensuring L ∼ 1: the leakage is made constant,
unrelated to any secret. We insist nevertheless that, as the previous methods,
this method comes with no formal security argument. We also warn that we have
not thoroughly explored more general leakage attacks, varying the zero-tested
polynomials or keeping some encodings fixed.
It remains to see how short one can efficiently sample encodings following this
choice. To get tighter bounds, we look at the conditioning number (or distortion)
δ(
√
Σ) = max(σi(
√
Σ))
min(σi(
√
Σ))
, where σi runs over all embeddings. One easily verifies the
following properties:
δ(A(x)) = δ(x)2 (17)
δ(xk) = δ(x)|k| for any k ∈ R, (18)
δ(xy) ≤ δ(x)δ(y). (19)
If a variable x ∈ KR has independent continuous Gaussian coefficients of
parameter 1, then its embeddings are (complex) Gaussian variables of parameter
Θ(
√
n), and it holds with constant probability that
∀i, Ω(1) ≤ |σi(x)| ≤ O(
√
n log n). (20)
Indeed, the right inequality follows from classic tail bounds on Gaussian. For the
left inequality, consider that |σi(x)| ≥ max(|(σi(x))|, |(σi(x))|), where both
the real and imaginary parts are independent Gaussian of parameter Θ(
√
n):
each part will be smaller than Θ(1) with probability at most 1/
√
2n. By inde-
pendence, |σi(x)| ≤ Θ(1) holds with probability at most 1/2n for each i, and
one may conclude by the union bound.
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By scaling (and plausibly ignoring discreteness issues since g and h are sam-
pled above the smoothing parameter of Zn) we can therefore assume, using
rejection sampling over h and g, that δ(g), δ(h) ≤ O(√n log n) , and therefore
δ(
√
Σ) = δ(A(g/h))1/2κ ≤ (δ(g)δ(h))1/κ ≤ O(n log n)1/κ.
This allows us to scale Σ so that:
• ‖g/√Σ‖ ≤ o(1/√log n), so that we can sample efficiently via Theorem 2.
• E = √n·‖√Σ‖ ≤ √n·‖g‖·δ(√Σ)·ω(√log n) = O(n1.5+1/κ+ε): the size of the
numerators of the encodings is barely worse than in the simplistic method,
and significantly better than in all other methods.
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